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Philosophy 252/History of Modern Philosophy
Professor Deborah Slicer
E-mail: ds7p@selway.umt.edu

LA148
Phone: 243-2527
Office Hours: TBA

Philosophy 252 covers philosophical figures and movements from roughly the
16th century through the 18th century. We give special attention to debates in metaphysics
and epistemology and somewhat less attention to politics, ethics, and religion. I have
three primary goals in this course. First, I want to provide you with an historical context
for the philosophical debates that characterize the modem period. Second, I want you to
appreciate how the modem period significantly shaped the contemporary Euro-American
worldview. And, third, you will learn to closely read and to thoughtfully critique
philosophical arguments.
Please be advised of the following: (1) I don't accept late papers, unless attached
to a doctor's excuse. (2) I consider group efforts plagiarism, unless I've specified the
project a group one, e.g., the presentation debate. Please see me if you have any questions
about plagiarism. (3) Class starts at 3:40 and ends at 5:00. Please come on time and don't
leave early, unless you've notified me of some special need. Thanks. Let's be considerate
of each other.

Text:
Modern Philosophy, ed. Roger Ariew & Eric Watkins
(x)--Xerox. Hard copies and ERes in library
Assignments:
1127
Hello, business, introductory remarks
1129
Socio-historical context of the modem period: Modem Philosophy (MP),
General Introduction, Vespucci (x), Luther (x), Erasmus (x)
2/3
Montaigne (x)
2/5-2/19
Descartes, Meditations
2124
Descartes debate
2/26
Spinoza, Theologica-Political Treatise (x)
3/3-3/5
Spinoza, Ethics, Part 1
3/10
Spinoza Debate
3/12
Mid-term exam
3/17-3/31
Essay, Locke
412
Locke debate
417-419
Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley
4/14-4/21
Inquiry, Hume
4123
Hume debate
2"d exam
4128
4130-517
Prolegomena, Kant
5/12
Final Exam, 3:20-5:20
Requirements:
Exam I:
25%
Exam II:
25%
Final:
25%
Debate:
10%
Summaries: 15%

Debate Presentation
Each student must participate in a debate presentation once.
Groups of 6-7 students will be responsible for debating a figure in
front of the class. One group of 3 or so will defend the figure,
while another group of 3 or so will ~sk 3 questions of the figure.
One of those questions must be posed from the perspective of a
figure we have already read. E.g. , you might have Hume ask Kant a
question or Locke question Descartes. A second question should be
stated as the group's objection to some specific, but central,
point the philosopher makes. I'll leave the nature of the third
question to· the group's discretion.
Each question should be
written up in a minimum of 3 good sized paragraphs. That is, you
should develop each question into a mini-paper, referring to
specifics in the texts and giving us some solid sense of why you
are asking the question. The challengers must distribute xeroxed
copies of their questions to all students on the class before the
scheduled debate. This way everyone will have prior opportunity to
research and respond to these quest~ons.
I'll provide you with
sample questions soon .
. Nondebaters will prepare . their o~ three questions an~ bring
those to class on the day of the debate. ·You don't need copies for
everyone, but you will turn your question~ in to .me on the day of
the debate.
'
·
" .
The formal debate will take place during ~he first so minutes
of class. During the last 30 minutes nondebaters will ask their
own questions of the group representing the figure on
. the hot seat.
.
.



Please be advised: those who don't follow these instructions
will be docked 1/2 a letter grade. · So, see me if you have any
questions about this procedure.
· ·
·
·
And feel free to run questions by me prior to these debates.

\
Sample Debate Questions
Montaigne's •The Apology for Raimond Sebond"
1. } [Response from a prior philosopher] Galileo was no skeptic. · He
asserts that God provided us with senses, reason, and intellect so
that · we can decipher the meaning of the· universe, God's divine
creation. He acknowledges that divine wisdom far surpasses human
knowledge, but, he says, "I do not feel obliged to believe that
that same God who has endowed tis with senses, reason, intellect has
intended to forgo their use .and by some other means to give us
knowledge which we can attain by them" {p. 63}. Indeed, he argues,
"Philosophy is written in this grand book, ·the universe, which
stands continually open to our gaze.
But the book cannot be
understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language. . . It
is written in the language of mathematics ... {p. 65}.
In addition to mathematical truths, which are apparently
accessible to us, we can have knowledge of other first principles.
For example, we can safely say that the whole is greater than its
parts. Why would God give us the various powers of reason if not
to discover such truths and deduce further truths from these?
Montaigne suggests that the creator endowed us with reason so that
we could argue ourselves into a stupor, become empty vessels,
"blank slates, " at which time God, in His grace, would fil.l us up
with truth.
Why would God give us such a round-about means of
finding truth? Such a God would seem Tll?llevolent and frivolous, not
the Christian God.
Besides, to challenge our rationality, the way Montaigne
challenges and trivialize~ it, is to destroy our humanity, to turn
us into beasts. Surely, we, human beings, are closer to the truth,
and to God, than the ox or Montaigne's cat. Scripture clearly says
this is the case. Montaigne's attempts to equate humanity with the
lower animals {p . . 71) defies commonsense and may even be
blasphemous. .
2.} [Objection] Montaigne argues that because all is in doubt, we
ought to accept Christianity on faith alone . . For example, he says
that "Our faith is not of our own acquiring. It is a pure present
of another's liberality.
It is not by reasoning or by our
understanding that we have received religion; it is by external
authority and command" {p. 72).
And he cites Corinthians to
buttress his case. Once it sinks in that religion is a matter of
faith and not understanding, that we couldn't possibly understand
something as awesome as the divine, we humbly open ourselves to
divine grace, to His gift of knowledge.
Montaigne's argument is a non sequitur. Just because all is
doubt, doesn't mean that we must (a} accept Christianity on faith,
or {b) accept Christianity at all . With regard to (a}, all may
wetl be in doubt, but we may still seek and offer compelling

...
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reasons on behalf of Christianity. We can do so as good P.yrrhonic
skeptics, in fact, as Christians who acknowledge doubt, the
uncertainty, of the reasons we offer.
'
And, regarding (b), if all is doubt, then so . is Christianity.
Why not accept Judaism, or some variety of paganism, or better yet.,
become an agnostic? Montaigne is addressing the Reformists, among
others here. But why not embrace Calvinism? Why throw your lot in
with the Catholic papacy, if there are no criteria for deciding
veracity of any sort, theological, scientific, or political? (See
Montaigne's discussion of criteria on p. 80-81.)
3 . ) [Open Question) Montaigne says that Pyrrhonian skeptics cannot
adequately express their . brand of ·skepticism in any language
available to them. ·This is because all languages rely solely.on
affirnia.tive propositions: "I have two heads," or "I do not have two
heads , " or, even, "I don' t know if I have one or two heads . " Each
of these statements ass~rts something is true, is certain.
The
Pyrrhonian skeptic, unlike more dogmatic skeptic~, want to avoid
assertions of any sort of truth. They don't even want to assert
the truth of Pyrrhonian skepticism, as that would contradict their
view that nothing, not even their own view, is ce~tain.
Is this a tenable position? If one can~t articulate it, how
can any . of us fully understand it, much less practice it?
Montaigne uses two analogies in order to better articulate the
Pyrrhonistic position. First, he takes an analogy from medicine
(p. 73), involving rhubarb. What, exactly, does this analogy mean
and how is it directly relevant to his position?
Second, he uses a pair of scales as an analogy. Above the
scales, he says, are inscribed the Pyrrhonist's motto, a question,
not an assertion, "What do I know?" {pg. 73)
What does this
analogy mean, and how is it relevant to Pyrrhonism?

..._..,l.;.;..;:..__•-....,·

